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DAY-IN-THE-LIFE FILMS: THE
CELLULOID WITNESS COMES TO THE
AID OF THE PLAINTIFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
Traditionally, motion pictures have been used by attorneys
defending personal injury actions to expose malingering plain-
tiffs.' Recently, however, plaintiffs' attorneys have begun to use
"day-in-the-life" films to net large recoveries for personal injury
clients.2 These films are documentaries, usually fifteen to fifty
minutes long, which demonstrate for the jury the extent of the
plaintiff's injuries, disabilities, and therapy. The introduction of
a day-in-the-life film in evidence, however, is not a simple mat-
ter but requires an extensive foundation and careful production
and presentation of the film. This Note examines the admissibil-
ity requirements for day-in-the-life films, objections to their ad-
missibility, and the procedural implications of their use. It sug-
gests guidelines for making and presenting an acceptable film.
II. REQUIREMENTS FOR ADMISSIBILITY
For well over a century, still photographs have been admis-
sible in evidence despite objections that they misrepresent the
subject portrayed.3 Because motion pictures are nothing more
* See Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO. L. REV. 235 (1965).
1. See generally Sweet, The Motion Picture as a Fraud Detector, 21 A.B.A.J. 653
(1935).
2. E.g., Munns v. Vaughn, 20 ATLA L. Rep. 128 (Alaska Dist. Ct. 1977)(6.5 million
dollar judgment); Savage v. Van Marle, 15 ATLA News L. 219 (Cal. Super. Ct. June
1972)(1.6 million dollar award for brain damage in jury waived trial); Cyester v.
Gregoris, 15 ATLA News L. 217 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 1972)(1 million dollar settlement
for brain damage after film shown to defense attorneys prior to trial); Bush v. General
Elec. Co., 13 ATLA News L. 474-5 (Nev. Dist. Ct. Dec. 1970), al'd, 498 P.2d 366 (Nev.
1972)(3.5 million dollar judgment for brain damage and resulting paralysis).
3. See, e.g., State v. Fox, 25 N.J.L. 566 (1856). South Carolina has followed the
traditional rule in this area. See, e.g., Holmes v. Black River Elec. Coop., Inc., 274 S.C.
256, 262 S.E.2d 875 (1980); State v. Shaw, 273 S.C. 194, 255 S.E.2d 799 (1979); State v.
Denson, 269 S.C. 407, 237 S.E.2d 761 (1977); Joyner v. St. Matthews Builders, 263 S.C.
136, 208 S.E.2d 48 (1974); Rhodes v. Spartanburg County, 262 S.C. 644, 207 S.E.2d 85
(1974); Still v. Hampton & Branchville R.R., 258 S.C. 416, 189 S.E.2d 15 (1972); Ledford
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than a series of still photographs imprinted sequentially on film
to add motion, many courts have admitted films on the same
basis as still photographs. In both cases, two requirements for
admissibility exist: the subject portrayed must be relevant to an
issue in the case, and the photograph or film must be an accu-
rate reproduction of persons and subjects about which oral testi-
mony is presented.'
The Federal Rules of Evidence define relevant evidence as
that which tends "to make the existence of any fact that is of
consequence to the determination of the action more or less
probable."8 Thus, a day-in-the-life film must be probative of
some issue in the case, such as the extent of the plaintiff's inju-
ries, pain and suffering, inability to enjoy life, range of activities,
and therapy.
7
Because a motion picture is merely a mechanical reproduc-
tion of a witness' testimony rather than direct evidence, it must
be properly authenticated by the offering party.8 In the past,
courts have required a more extensive foundation for films than
for photographs because film was believed to be more easily al-
v. R.G. Foster & Co., 252 S.C. 546, 167 S.E.2d 575 (1969).
4. See Powell v. Industrial Comm'n, 4 Ariz. App. 172, 418 P.2d 602 (1966), vacated
on other grounds, 102 Ariz. 11, 423 P.2d 348 (1967); People v. Hayes, 21 Cal. App. 2d
320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937); McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940);
Morriss v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, 139 S.W.2d 984 (1940); Streit v.
Kestel, 108 Ohio App. 241, 161 N.E.2d 409 (1959); Lampley v. Waygood, 57 Tenn. App.
610, 422 S.W.2d 708 (1967); Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1947); Hare, Demonstrative Evidence, 27 ALA. LAw. 193, 196-98 (1966).
5. See Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 1944); Thomas
v. C.G. Tate Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566, 569-71 (D.S.C. 1979); Grimes v. Employers
Mut. Liab. Ins. Co., 73 F.R.D. 607, 609 (D. Alaska 1977); Miles Laboratories, Inc. v.
Frolich, 195 F. Supp. 256, 263 (S.D. Cal. 1961); Streit v. Kestel, 108 Ohio App. 241, 245-
46, 161 N.E.2d 409, 413 (1959); Hayward v. Ginn, 306 P.2d 320, 324 (Okla. 1957); John B.
Kelley Co. v. Workmen's Comp. App. Bd., 8 Pa. Commw. Ct. 589, 592, 303 A.2d 255, 257
(1973).
6, FED. R. Evil. 401. See generally 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S Evi-
DENCE 401 (1980).
7. Furthermore, because determination of the relevance of offered evidence is wiihin
the trial court's sound discretion, decisions that films are relevant evidence are seldom
disturbed on appeal. 3 C. SCOTT, PHOTOGRAPHIC EVIDENCE § 1296 (2d ed. 1969). If the
film contains any irrelevant material, however, the entire film may be excluded; the trial
court is not obligated to edit out irrelevant sequences. See Morriss v. E.I. DuPont de
Nemours & Co., 346 Mo. 126, 132, 139 S.W.2d 984, 988 (1940).
8. Sanchez v. Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 538 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1976); UAW v. Russell,
264 Ala. 456, 88 So.2d 175 (1956); Balian v. General Motors, 121 N.J. Super. 118, 296
A2d 317 (1972).
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tered and distorted.9 The photographer was required to testify
to his skill and experience; the type, mechanics, quality, and
quantity of the photographic equipment and film used; and the
conditions under which the film was made. Explanation of the
process of developing and printing the film; any distortions of
height, distance, illumination, or spatial relationships caused by
that process; and any editing and splicing was also required. Fi-
nally, the photographer had to testify to the speed of the film-
ing, the mechanics and speed of projection, the distance of the
projector from the screen, and to the accuracy of the film's
portrayal. 10
Modern courts are satisfied by testimony that proves the re-
liability and accuracy of the finished film.'1 Although the tradi-
tional criteria illustrate the broadest possible foundation that
could be required, brief direct examination of the authenticating
witness on only those technical points of the photographic pro-
cess familiar to most laymen appears to provide a sufficient
foundation. 2 The authenticating witness should identify the
persons, objects, and places pictured; testify that the film is a
true and accurate representation of the events he observed while
filming; and explain briefly the circumstances of taking, develop-
ing, and projecting the film.'3 The identity of the authenticating
witness is unimportant so long as he or she was present when
the film was taken and observed the people and events por-
9. McElroy & McWelthy, Motion Pictures, -A Potent Factor in Trial Work, MED.
TRiAL TECH. Q., Sept. 1955, at 109, 110.
10. McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 27 N.E.2d 289 (1940)(motion picture of
malingering plaintiff was admitted only after an elaborate foundation was laid). For a list
of the elements of proof, see 18 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS, 153, 157-58 (1960).
11. E.g., Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 609 (sufficient verification provided by photographer's
testifying that he was a professional, that he used a camera in good condition, that the
material filmed was not rehearsed, that no special effects were used, that the film was
not edited, and that it accurately portrayed what he had personally observed); Long v.
General Elec. Co., 213 Ga. 809, 102 S.E.2d 9 (1958)(motion picture held admissible on
basis of foundation testimony by witness-photographer that it portrayed what he saw);
Balian, 121 N.J. Super. at 125, 296 A.2d at 320-21 (1972)(authenticating witness must
testify to the circumstances surrounding the taking of the film, the manner and circum-
stances of its development, and evidence about its projection and its accuracy).
12. A sample direct examination for use in establishing a film's authenticity is pro-
vided in Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO. L. REv. 239 (1965).
13. See Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 609; Kortz, 144 F.2d at 679; Balian, 121 N.J. Super. at
125, 296 A.2d at 320-21; Hayward, 306 P.2d at 324.
1982] 579
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trayed.1' Nevertheless, the practitioner should bear in mind that
the credibility and weight given to any film is based in part on
the credibility and expertise of the authenticating witness. 15 For
this reason, a professional photographer who can withstand
technical attacks on cross-examination and who can elicit the
trust of the jury is most effective. 5 As a practical matter, if a
photographer's assistant is to testify in the photographer's ab-
sence, the assistant should have observed the making of the film.
III. OBJECTIONS TO DAY-IN-THE-LIFE FILMS
A. Hearsay
Hearsay evidence may be defined as in-court testimony to
an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth of the mat-
ter asserted.1 7 In certain situations, a hearsay objection to the
showing of a day-in-the-life film may be well founded. For exam-
ple, a staged demonstration on film is assertive conduct and as
such is inadmissible unless it qualifies as an exception to the
hearsay rule.18 A few courts have held that a film of the plaintiff
demonstrating. his injury by doing normal, unstaged activities is
equivalent to a witness' testimony about assertive conduct to
prove the extent of the plaintiff's injuries and is therefore inad-
missible as hearsay.19 The majority view on unstaged activities,
however, is to the contrary.20
14. See Kortz, 144 F.2d at 676.
15. A motion picture may distort its subject matter in many ways. Light can be
filtered to create a gloomy or bright environment. Lighting gels can be used to highlight
certain colors, like the redness of the skin. Sound can be taped on two separate tracks,
picking up soft gasping or labored breathing even on a long camera shot. The product
may also enhance certain specific noises, such as the tearing sound a bandage makes on
skin, the bumping of a prosthesis, or the clicking of a brace. Prieser & Hoffman, "Day In
The Life" Films-Coming of Age in the Courtroom, TRmAL, Aug. 1981, at 30.
16. McElroy & McWelthy, supra note 9, at 110.
17. C. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK's HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 246 (2d ed.
1972).
18. FED. R. EVID. 801(a). See Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 607 (film showing the plaintiff
performing tasks to demonstrate his disability was assertive conduct); Foster, 496 F.2d at
791 (dicta suggesting such a film was testimony of assertive conduct).
19. See, e.g., Haley v. Byers Transp. Co., 414 S.W.2d 777 (Mo. 1967)(film of a para-
lyzed plaintiff getting from his bed into a wheelchair and a walker was properly excluded
as testimony by plaintiff that was not subject to cross-examination when film would have
a prejudicial effect that outweighed its probative value.
20. Bloch, The Direction and Presentation of a "Day in the Life" Film, 53 Wis. B.
BULL., Sept. 1980, at 20. See Balian, 121 N.J. Super. at 125, 296 A.2d at 324 (cross-
580 [Vol. 33
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Several answers to a common-law hearsay objection exist.
The offering party can meet the objection by arguing that films
of unstaged conduct are not hearsay because they are records of
nonassertive conduct.21 He can also argue that because the film
is free of the usual infirmities of hearsay2 2-the narrating wit-
ness and the individual subjects of the film are in court, under
oath, and available for cross-examination, it should be admitted
in evidence. 23 The rationale supporting this position is that the
narrating witness merely uses the film to illustrate his observa-
tions, much as a physician might use an anatomical chart or an
engineer might use diagrams and scale drawings to facilitate the
presentation of testimony.2" The film might also be admitted
under one of the common-law exceptions to the hearsay rule. If,
for example, the film shows the plaintiff consulting a physician
or therapist, the plaintiff's attorney can use the "declaration of
bodily condition" exception.25 The rationale for admitting these
examination does not ordinarily provide a sufficient avenue to rebut a motion picture of
a reconstructed or posed demonstration; offering party must give the adverse party no-
tice that film protrays staged event and chance to monitor making of film).
21. See C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, at 599-600 ("The position that hearsay in-
cludes neither non-assertive conduct nor assertive statements not offered to prove what
is asserted finds solid adherence in recent and current statutes and rules dealing with the
subject."). Id. See also UNiI. R. EVID. 62(1); CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 225, 1200 (West 1966);
KAN. CIV. PRO. CODE ANN. § 60-459(a) (Vernon 1965); N.J.R. EVID. 62(1) (1969).
22. Hearsay evidence is inadmissible because the party against whom the statement
is offered is unable to confront or cross-examine the original speaker and the original
speaker is not under oath. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 245.
23. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 610-11; Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 333 So. 2d 395,
397 (La. Ct. App. 1976); Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 250 S.W.2d 819, 823 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1947)(both therapist and plaintiff were available for cross-examination; court
held that main test for determining whether motion picture constitutes hearsay is
whether it is subject to cross-examination through witness who verifies and uses it). See
also UNm. R. Evm. 62(1), 63.
24. UAW v Russell, 264 Ala. 456, 88 So. 2d 175, aff'd, 356 U.S. 634 (1958). The film,
however, must illustrate and correspond exactly to the witness' testimony.
25. See C. McCORMICK, supra note 17, at 690, which states that
statements of a presently existing bodily condition made by a patient to a doc-
tor consulted for treatment are almost universally admitted as evidence of the
facts stated, and even courts greatly limiting the admissibility of declaration of
bodily conditions generally will admit statements made under these circum-
stances .... [T]heir reliability is assured by the likelihood that the patient
believes that the effectiveness of the treatment he receives may depend largely
upon the accuracy of the information he provides the physician.
Most courts, however, will not admit statements of present bodily condition made to a
physician consulted solely for trial preparation or testimony. In Gentry v. Watkins-Caro-
lina Trucking Co., 249 S.C. 316, 154 S.E.2d 112 (1967), the South Carolina Supreme
5
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statements is that the need for accurate diagnosis and treatment
and the opportunity to cross-examine the physician afford ap-
propriate hearsay safeguards. 26 This rationale not only supports
the introduction of films illustrating the physician's testimony
but also supports the patient's out-of-court statements.
In the federal courts, the hearsay exception embodied in
Federal Rule of Evidence 803(24) may be available.2 Under this
rule, the trial court has the discretion to admit hearsay evidence
of a material fact if the evidence is sufficiently probative and
trustworthy and the purpose of the evidentiary rules is best
served by its admission. 28 Although this rule is intended to be
used "very rarely and only in exceptional circumstances,"2 9 at
least one court has found it applicable to day-in-the-life films. In
Grimes v. Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co.,"° the Dis-
trict Court of Alaska determined that these films can be highly
probative of the nature and extent of the plaintiff's injuries and
disabilities and that they contain the necessary "circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness" when the verifying witness and
individual subjects are available for cross-examination by the
opposing party.3' Moreover, because rule 803(24) requires that
sufficient advance notice be given to provide the opposing party
with a fair opportunity to meet the evidence,3 2 the defendant
33cannot honestly claim unfair surprise.
B. Editing
Although editing ideally should be avoided, presentation of
an unedited film is normally impractical. Removal of unneeded
Court adopted the view that a physician consulted as a prospective witness may testify
to the plaintiff's statements of present condition and past symptoms; however, the testi-
mony is not admissible as proof of the facts stated but only as information relied upon
by the physician to support his opinion. See also FED. R. EviD. 803(4).
26. C. McCoRMICK, supra note 17, at 690-92.
27. See generally J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, 803(24)[01].
28. Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
29. Id.
30. 73 F.R.D. 607 (D. Alaska 1977).
31. Id. at 611.
32. FED. R. EVID. 803(24).
33. "Use of this exception is justified . . .where the normal hearsay problems do
not exist or can be remedied. [Where film is used] [t]here are no problems with percep-
tion, memory, or meaning, and any sincerity problems can be solved by having the veri-
fying witness or plaintiff-actor subject to cross-examination." Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 611.
[Vol. 33
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footage is a prerequisite of a smooth, effective film because the
beneficial impact on a jury of an unedited film may be lost if the
film is cumbersome. Furthermore, some scenes may embarrass
both plaintiff and jury, and much "dead" film may be produced
while the camera is being moved, while the plaintiff is awaiting
therapy, or when individual subjects "freeze" before the camera.
Finally, unedited film may contain relevant but prejudicial ma-
terial-for example, scenes of the plaintiff moaning because of
painful therapy-that must be removed to avoid an objection.
3 4
These are legitimate reasons for editing to which the courts
should give deference.
The majority of courts subscribe to the rule that editing
goes to the evidentiary weight given a film but does not affect its
admissibility.3 5 A minority of jurisdictions have excluded edited
film on grounds that editing destroys the sequence and chronol-
ogy of the film and confuses the jury.36 An unusual limitation on
editing was imposed by the court in Grimes,37 which determined
that part of the required authenticating foundation was a guar-
antee that the film had not previously been edited by the plain-
tiff.8 The court said that it should be permitted to preview the
unedited film so that it might identify and require the removal
of any prejudicial or cumulative sequences.3 9 Thus, the court
completely forbade nonjudicial, pretrial editing,40 a rigid ap-
proach that appears to be unwarranted. On direct examination
34. Thomas, 465 F. Supp. at 566. See notes 54-69 and accompanying text infra. Be-
cause the court is under no duty to edit out the objectionable segments of film, the film
will be excluded if not properly edited. Morriss v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 346
Mo. 126, 139 S.W.2d 984 (1940); C. Scorr, supra note 7, at 159.
35. Appelby v. State, 221 Ind. 544, 49 N.E.2d 533 (1943).
36. See, e.g., Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co., 257 F.2d 93, 100
(10th Cir. 1958)(matter of the editing of film goes to weight of evidence and not to ad-
missibility); Pritchard v. Downie, 326 F.2d 323, 326 (8th Cir. 1964) (citing Millers'). See
also UAW v. Russell, 264 Ala. 456, 470, 88 So.2d 175, 186 (1956)- Thomas v. C.G. Tate
Constr. Co., 465 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1979) (implied that edited film would be admissi-
ble). But see Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 607 (editing of film allowed only by court order).
Because photographs introduced into evidence need not be presented in the same order
in which they were taken, the same should hold true for film.
37. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 609.
38. Id. at 609.
39. Id. at 610 n.1.
40. Scott, in his treatise on photographic evidence states that the "removal of irrele-
vant sequences is all the editing that should be permitted." 3 C. Sco[r, supra note 7, at
160.
1982]
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of a client or a friendly witness, an attorney in effect "edits" the
witness' testimony by asking questions that present evidence in
the most favorable light and in the desired - order. Opposing
counsel has the task on cross-examination of discrediting that
testimony by bringing out facts and circumstances the first at-
torney purposely avoided. The device of cross-examination is
used to assure presentation of the entire truth. Because film is,
in actuality, the narrating witness' testimony, cross-examination
of the narrating witness should serve the same purpose in this
context.
A less restrictive safeguard than that imposed in Grimes is
available. The offering party can simply make available for judi-
cial preview both the edited and unedited versions of a film.
41
Recommendations for correcting any objectionable features of
the film can then be made during the preview. Afterward, the
veracity of the film should no longer be an issue-opportunities
for cross-examining the plaintiff and the authenticating witness
and for previewing the entire unedited film assure trustworthi-
ness. Furthermore, a judicial preview guarantees the film's ad-
mission at trial and virtually eliminates subsequent reversal on
appeal. 42 Thus, at the proper time, the offering party should
move to have the film previewed by the adverse party and the
court.4
3
41. Accord, Prieser & Hoffman, supra note 15, at 29.
42. The trial court, however, is granted wide discretion in determining the admissi-
bility of film. If certain precautions are taken at the trial level (e.g., notice to adverse
party and judicial preview), an appellate court will seldom overturn the trial court's deci-
sion to admit a film. See, e.g., Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916, 921 (8th Cir. 1958)(no
abuse of discretion by trial court despite appellate court's opinion that film's admission
was unwise); Kortz v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 144 F.2d 676, 679 (10th Cir. 1944)(question
of sufficiency of photographic evidence is largely within discretion of trial court); Butler
v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812, 816 (Miss. 1972) (the trial court is afforded wide latitude
in exercising discretion to admit or exclude films).
43. Bloch, supra note 20, at 22. See, e.g., Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Serv. Co., 333 So.
2d 395, 402 (La. 1976)(film edited at judicial preview). The film should be previewed by
the court regardless of whether it has been edited by the offering party.
[A]ny unused film.., must, of course, be kept and catalogued for review by
opposing counsel and the court. To insure against a fatal evidentiary flaw, it is
wise to plan the entire film in advance so that any objectionable material is
kept to a minimum. [If there is too much editing], it could be forcefully argued
that the production is not accurately representing a routine day.
Prieser & Hoffman, supra note 15, at 30.
[Vol. 33
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C. Lack of Continuity of Action in the Film
Day-in-the-life films may portray the continuous activities
of the plaintiff during a single time period or may consist of a
series of shorter segments of the plaintiff's activities filmed on
the same reel at different times. Although an offer of proof that
a film shows continuity of action generally is not essential to ad-
missibility,44 a lack of continuity may adversely affect the evi-
dentiary weight accorded the film. Furthermore, overly selective
filming may destroy the film's probative value and render the
film inadmissible.45 The photographer should thus be prepared
to explain why discontinuous filming took place and what types
of activities were not filmed.
D. Cumulative Effect
At least one court has excluded a film when its subject mat-
ter had already been extensively described by oral testimony,
even though the film provided a more graphic representation. 6
The majority position, however, holds that a film depicting a
plaintiff undergoing clinical tests or performing daily functions
to which appropriate witnesses have thoroughly testified is not
cumulative because films more effectively testify to the plain-
tiff's pain, suffering, and loss of enjoyment of life.47 The majority
of courts find day-in-the-life films cumulative only when they
follow other photographic evidence dealing with the same sub-
ject matter.48 Although an objection in this context might be
countered with the argument that the addition of motion makes
the evidence different in kind from still photographs,4 9 a practi-
44. C. ScoTT, supra note 7, at 157; McGoorty v. Benhart, 305 Ill. App. 458, 467, 27
N.E.2d 289, 294 (1940).
45. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 610; J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, at
1001(2)[03].
46. Johnson, 604 F.2d at 958. The cumulative eVidence objection in Johnson was a
make-weight measure to support the court's decision to exclude a film that distorted the
evidence. The modem view is that films are cumulative only of other photographic evi-
dence. 73 F.R.D. at 609. But see Balian v. General Motors Corp., 121 N.J. Super. 118,
128, 296 A.2d 317, 324 (1972)(court noted that film is by nature cumulative).
47. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 610. See also Prieser & Hoffman, supra note 15, at 28:
"[t]he film is the most efficient and authentic evidence plaintiff can offer."
48. C. ScoTT, supra note 7, § 1022.
49. See Richardson v. Missouri-K.-T. Ry., 205 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App.
1947)(court admitted film of certain machinery even though forty-seven still photo-
graphs of same machinery had already been introduced).
1982]
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tioner should exercise caution when introducing any still photo-
graphic evidence before presenting a film.
E. Prejudice
Courts traditionally view the use of motion pictures as de-
monstrative evidence with a jaundiced eye because improperly
made films may be inflammatory and prejudicial. A film's vivid
impression on a jury is almost impossible either to limit, if the
film has been properly admitted, or to expunge, if its admission
has been improper2°
Some subjects are so prejudicial that films portraying them
are excluded almost as a matter of course. Footage of a plaintiff
grimacing or accompanied by a soundtrack of a plaintiff moan-
ing while undergoing therapy for injuries allegedly caused by the
defendant ordinarily falls into this category. Expositions such as
these might easily inflame a jury and diminish the likelihood of
an impartial judgment.51 In Thomas v. C.G. Tate Construction
Co.,5'2 an otherwise acceptable film was excluded because it
showed the plaintiff undergoing painful physical therapy for
burns that covered his arms and upper torso. The soundtrack
carried his moans and close-ups revealed his face contorted by
what appeared to be great pain. In excluding the entire film, the
court noted that not only the plaintiff, but also his doctor, wife,
and therapist would be able to testify about the painfulness of
50. The novelty of using video tape in the courtroom in and of itself may make
the [presentation] stand out in the minds of the jury. Unquestionably it will
dominate the evidentiary scene. This court is greatly concerned that its domi-
nating effect will distract the jury from its proper consideration of other issues
they will be called on to decide .... No amount of testimony from the attend-
ing physician, nurses, etc., could possibly offset the dramatic effect of the
[tape] in question.
Tate, 465 F. Supp. at 571.
51. See, e.g., Grimes, 73 F.R.D. 607. The offered film showed the plaintiff perform-
ing daily functions and clinical tests, which showed how limited he was in seeking en-
tertainment and how physically debilitating his injury was. The film was held to be more
probative than prejudicial because it illustrated better than words the plaintiff's pain,
suffering, and loss of enjoyment. "While the scenes are unpleasant, so is the plaintiffs
injury." Id. at 610. Weinstein suggests that when a film's admissibility is in doubt, it
should be admitted with the proper instruction. 1 J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra
note 6, 403[01]. See Reggio v. Louisiana Gas Sew. Co., 333 So.2d 395 (La. App. 1976);
Swaggard v. Haney, 363 So.2d 251 (Miss. 1978); Holmes v. Black River Elec. Coop., Inc.,
274 S.C. 252, 262 S.E.2d 875 (1980).
52. 465 F. Supp. 566 (D.S.C. 1979).
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the therapy.53 The approach of the court in Thomas is typical.5 4
Unless family members are an integral part of the plaintiff's
therapy, scenes of the plaintiff with his family may be prejudi-
cial and irrelevant and should ordinarily be excluded. 5 Theatri-
cal scenes verging on melodrama should similarly be avoided. An
understated scene depicting a plaintiff resolutely attempting to
adapt to his new life will have sufficient impadct on a jury and yet
avoid the likelihood of successful objection. Sensational content
alone, however, does not render a film inadmissible as long as it
presents relevant evidence on the nature and extent of the plain-
tiff's injuries accurately and without exaggeration. Similarly,
evidence that is ghastly or gruesome should be admissible as
long as it has not been introduced for its shock effect alone.57
53. Id. at 571.
54 See, e.g., Butler v. Chrestman, 264 So. 2d 812 (Miss. 1972)("day in the life" film
of a paraplegic was excluded as cumulative because one of the final scenes showed her
crying from pain and frustration).
55. Grimes, 73 F.R.D. at 610.
56. People v. Cheary, 48 Cal. 2d 301, 309 P.2d 431 (1957); Commonwealth v.
Makarewicz, 333 Mass. 575, 132 N.E.2d 294 (1956). See generally C. ScoTT, supra note 7,
at § 1296. In Holmes v. Black River Elec. Coop., Inc., 274 S.C. 252, 262 S.E.2d 875
(1980), the trial court admitted into evidence pictures of the plaintiff's injuries, which
defendant described as "hideous, grotesque, and grossly unfair." Defendant argued that
the photographs should have been excluded because they may have aroused the jury's
sympathy for the plaintiff. The South Carolina Supreme Court held that the pictures
were admissible if they accurately depicted plaintiff's injuries at the time the photo-
graphs were taken and that they were not introduced for the sole purpose of inflaming
the minds of the jury. Holmes, 274 S.C. at 258, 262 S.E.2d at 878. The court considered
the pictures demonstrative evidence that aided the jury in its evaluation of the injuries
and the pain suffered and added that they were "admissible as a matter of discretion by
the trial judge, if not as a matter of right." Id. at 258, 262 S.E.2d at 878 (emphasis
added). Since an analogy can be drawn between photographs and films, South Carolina
courts may take a very liberal view of the admissibility of motion picture evidence.
57. 465 F. Supp. at 569. See, e.g., Anderson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 377 F. Supp.
136 (E.D. La. 1974)(photographs of plaintiff's severely burned body admitted as relevant
to nature and extent of injuries, even though pictures presented horrifying spectacle).
By analogy, unembellished films of gruesome injuries should be admitted under even
a conservative reading of FED. R. Evm. 403, if a film is accurate and presents evidence
material to the offering party's cause of action. See Lehmuth v. Long Beach Unified
School Dist., 53 Cal. 2d 544, 348 P.2d 887, 2 Cal. Rptr. 279 (1960)(film of hospitalized
plaintiff in bed with life support tubes in arms and throat, thrashing about in the midst
of a coma, was admissible). See also Faught v. Washain, 329 S.W.2d 588 (Mo. 1959).
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IV. PROCEDURAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Adequate Notice
Although introduction of a day-in-the-life film at trial with-
out previous warning may give the offering party a tactical ad-
vantage, advance notice to both the court and the adverse party
precludes the possibility of exclusion for unfair surprise."8 Of
course, if the offering party is asked through discovery to pro-
duce the report of the expert whose testimony the film illus-
trates, then the film's existence must be disclosed.5 9 Otherwise,
adequate notice may be provided by use of the judicial preview
process discussed earlier.6 0 During the preview, the plaintiff's at-
torney should make available all footage shot in making the film
and should secure stipulations, approval of pretrial editing, and
an advance ruling on the film's admissibility.
B. Bifurcation
Although a day-in-the-life film is normally relevant only on
the issue of the plaintiff's damages, it may be sufficiently force-
ful to influence a jury's decision on the question of the defen-
dant's liability. Consequently, the defendant may find it desira-
ble to seek a bifurcated proceeding, that is, separation of the
determination of liability from the determination of damages.' 1
58. Foster, 496 F.2d at 790. Although the film was excluded for other reasons, the
court noted with disapproval that it had been made without notice to the defendant.
59. See Sanchez v. Denver & R.G.W. R.R., 538 F.2d 304 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977)(adverse party should have been able to discover the film);
Balian, 121 N.J. Super. 118, 296 A.2d 317 (1972)(verdict for the defendant reversed be-
cause existence of film not disclosed when plaintiff requested production of reports of
defendant's narrating experts).
60. See, e.g., Brandt v. French, 638 F.2d 209, 212 (10th Cir. 1981)(trial judge should
preview film outside jury's presence); Millers' Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Wichita Flour Mills Co.,
257 F.2d 93, 100 (10th Cir. 1958)(preview is correct procedure). See also Prieser & Hoff-
man, supra note 15, at 30. Scott suggests that the preview should be conducted under
the same conditions that prevail when the jury sees the film. The offering party should
therefore attempt to use the same projector, screen, and room as contemplated for trial.
C. ScorT, supra note 7, at § 1296.
61. Vogel, The Issues of Liability and of Damages in Tort Cases Should Be Sepa-
rated for the Purpose of Trial, A.B.A. Section of Insurance, Negligence, & Compensation
Law Proceedings 265, 269 (1960); "the separation of the trial [into consideration of liabil-
ity and then damages] will tend to reduce prejudice against defendants and should elimi-
nate or greatly reduce the effect of sympathy and compassion in personal litigation." See
also Beeck v. Aquaslide-n-Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 1977)(appellate court
noted that, due to the severe and extensive injuries plaintiff had suffered, evidence of
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A bifurcated trial may be less time consuming than a unified
one; if no liability is found, the need to present evidence on the
damage issue is eliminated.62 Bifurcation also improves the trial
by forcing the jury to decide the case according to the substan-
tive legal guidelines laid down by the judge.63
Although the defendant is not absolutely entitled to a sever-
ance of the issues,' bifurcation is usually granted upon request.
The decision rests within the sound discretion of the trial court 5
and absent a showing of prejudice, will seldom be reversed on
appeal.6 Courts generally permit a severance of the issues upon
a showing that the issues are distinct and separable;67 the plain-
tiff's offer of proof of damages is disproportionately greater than
his offer of proof on liability;68 or the offer of proof of damages
may overly prejudice the jury in favor of the plaintiff.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 42(b) authorizes federal
damages, if introduced with evidence of liability, might be prejudicial to defendant.
Thus, the trial court's bifurcation of the trial had been proper); Bowie v. Sorrell, 113 F.
Supp. 373 (4th Cir. 1953)("Rule 42(b) has often been applied in actions for damages for
personal injuries . . . to avoid prejudice [to the defendant]"); Grissom v. Union Pac.
R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263 (D. Colo. 1953).
62. Zeisel & Calahan, Split Trials and Time Saving: A Statistical Analysis, 76
HARv. L. RE V. 1606 (1963). The authors' study revealed that bifurcated trials take twenty
percent less trial time than cases that simultaneously submit evidence of liability and
damages to the jury. Id. at 1619. But see Weinstein, Routine Bifurcation of Jury Negli-
gence Trials: An Example of the Questionable Use of Rule Making Power, 14 VAND. L.
REv. 831 (1961). One commentator has observed:
The great end for which courts are created is not efficiency. It is justice. We
cannot sacrifice the latter to attain the former. Perhaps the result is more just
when defendants win 79 percent of the cases. Perhaps juries are moved by
sympathy when they hear of the injuries to the plaintiff. But if so substantial a
change is to be made in the nature of jury trial and if the Seventh Amendment
permits such a change, it should be made deliberately on the merits by Con-
gress. It should not be made by the courts under the guise of an attack on
calendar congestion.
Wright, Procedural Reform: Its Limitations and Its Future, 52 A.B.A.J. 742 (1966).
63. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, at 852.
64. Sudderth v. National Lead Co., 272 F.2d 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1959).
65. Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 25 (6th Cir. 1965); Ammesmaki v.
Interlake S.S. Co., 342 F.2d 627, 631 (7th Cir. 1965); Bowie v. Sorrell, 209 F.2d 49, 51
(4th Cir. 1953); Grissom v. Union Pac. R.R., 14 F.R.D. 263, 264 (D. Colo. 1953).
66. C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, Brickenhoff, Quade & Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379, 1388
(4th Cir. 1969).
67. Kushner v. Hindon Constr., Inc., 81 F.R.D. 93 (D.C. Pa. 1979); Note, Separate
Trials on Liability and Damages in "Routine Cases". A Legal Analysis, 46 MINN. L.
REv. 1059, 1073-74 (1962).
68. J. WEINSTEIN & M. BERGER, supra note 6, at 853.
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trial judges to grant bifurcation. 9 The Advisory Committee
Notes to rule 42 indicate that bifurcation is "encouraged where
experience has demonstrated its worth" but add that separation
"is not to be routinely ordered. ' 70 Several courts have interpre-
tated this language as requiring limited use of bifurcation,7 1 and
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals has ruled that negligence
cases bifurcated routinely rather than on a case-by-case basis
will be reversed without a showing of prejudice.7 2 Finally, some
trial courts deny bifurcation when the issues of liability and
damages are interwoven and interdependent. s
Because a day-in-the-life film is almost always presented
only during the damages phase of a bifurcated trial, it has no
influence on the jury on the question of liability. Indeed, if a
jury finds for the defendant on the issue of liability, the film is
not used at all.y4 In some instances, however, bifurcation may
69. 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2390 (1971).
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) provides that "It]he court, in furtherance of convenience or to
avoid prejudice, or when separate trials will be conducive to expedition and economy,
may order a separate trial. . . of any separate issue. . . always preserving inviolate the
right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution ..
70. Advisory Committee Notes, FED. R. Civ. P. 42.
71. See, e.g., Moss v. Associated Transp., Inc., 344 F.2d 23, 26 (6th Cir. 1965); Eich-
inger v. Firemen's Fund Ins. Co., 20 F.R.D. 204, 207-08 (D. Neb. 1957).
72. Lis v. Robert Packer Hosp., 579 F.2d 819 (3d Cir. 1978). Pursuant to a district
procedural rule, the district court that decided Lis bifurcated negligence actions as a
matter of practice. The appellate court did not reverse but noted that
[t]his court has heretofore cast its lot with the views expressed by the Advisory
Committee that bifurcation "be encouraged where experience has demon-
strated its worth," but that "separation of issues for trial is not to be routinely
ordered." We adhere to that position. Thus a routine order of bifurcation in all
negligence cases is a practice at odds with the requirement that discretion be
exercised and seems to run counter to the intention of the rule drafters ....
We disapprove of a general practice of bifurcating all negligence cases. . . . A
general policy of a district judge bifurcating all negligence cases offends the
philosophy that a decision must be made by a trial judge only as a result of an
informed exercise of discretion on the merits of each case.
Id. at 824.
73. See, e.g., Franchi Constr. Co. v. Combined Ins. Co., 580 F.2d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 1978);
C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons, Brickenhoff, Quade & Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379, 1388 (4th
Cir. 1969)(separate trials held improper because jury had to make quantitative judgment
on amount of damage that resulted from plaintiff's own conduct and amount of damage
caused by others); United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener, 286 F.2d 302, 306 (9th Cir. 1961).
74. Rosenberg, Court Congestion: Status, Causes and Proposed Remedies, in THE
COURTS, THE PUSLIC, AND THE LAW ExPLOSION 29 (1965). This study found that defen-
dants win forty-two percent of cases tried routinely but win seventy-nine percent of the
cases in which the liability issue is tried before the damages issue. Id. at 49.
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work to the advantage of a plaintiff's attorney. Because liability
has already been established, the chance of unfair prejudice is
greatly reduced and the odds of the film's being admitted are
improved."5
V. PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Although tactics useful in presenting a day-in-the-life film
vary from case to case, certain guidelines are applicable gener-
ally. First, a film may be the plaintiff's most eloquent witness
and will have the greatest impact if presented at the end of his
case. The content of the film lingers in the minds of the jurors
and undercuts the effect of the defendant's evidence. Second, al-
though more than one presentation is not legally prohibited, a
film should not be shown more than once. During the first show-
ing, jurors ordinarily experience sufficient discomfort to become
sympathetic; a second showing may irritate jurors or toughen
their sensibilities. Third, court time consumed by mechanical
preparations for the film's projection must be kept to a mini-
mum. Readied and reliable equipment and a competent projec-
tionist are essential to showing a film without delay. Finally, a
film should be made by a professional photographer to' ensure
quality and predictability.
VI. CONCLUSION
Day-in-the-life films can be instrumental in securing for
plaintiffs, especially permanently injured plaintiffs, more ade-
quate recoveries in personal injury actions. This tool may have a
greater impact on a jury in twenty to fifty minutes than will
many hours of testimony. Films must be carefully prepared, in-
troduced, and presented in anticipation of possible objections to
their admissibility. Because the use of a day-in-the-life film to
prove a plaintiff's damages can influence the jury's decision on
the defendant's liability, proceedings in which these films will be
offered in evidence should be bifurcated to avoid the prejudice
75. Although purists and defense attorneys welcome the coming of bifurcated trials,
questions remain. Should the jury be deprived of its traditional ability to "temper" the
law? Are juries sophisticated enough to find liability if they see no damages?
1982] 591
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that predictably results from the use of this evidentiary
technique.
James A. Merritt, Jr.
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